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CHAPTER 33 
Evidence 
FREDERICK A. MC DERMOTT 
§33.1. Judicial notice: State administrative regulations. During 
the 1957 SURVEY year two cases came before the Supreme Judicial 
Court on appeal from decrees entered on findings by the Industrial 
Accident Board that the injury of the employee in the one case and his 
death in the other were not caused "by reason of the serious and wil-
ful misconduct of an employer or any person regularly intrusted with 
and exercising the powers of superintendence," under G.L., c. 152, §28.1 
In ]uozapaitis's Case,2 the Board found that the employer had em-
ployed a known minor without a work permit in violation of G.L., c. 
149. The Court reversed the decree for failure to apply Section 28, 
which provides expressly that such employment "shall constitute 
serious and wilful misconduct." This case is, of course, an example of 
the common application of the rule that the Industrial Accident Board, 
like the courts, is bound to notice judicially and apply domestic law 
which is in the form of statutes of general application. 
In the second of the cases, Diad;uk's Case,3 the claimant relied upon 
a violation of a regulation of the Department of Labor and Indus-
tries. The single member found that the employer's negligence and 
failure to comply with the regulations caused the death of the employee 
but further found that disregard of the regulations did not constitute 
serious and willful misconduct nor wanton or reckless disregard of its 
probable consequences, and dismissed the claim. The reviewing board 
affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court said that it would in any event 
affirm the decree denying the claim since the issue of serious and will-
ful misconduct of the employer is a question of fact upon which the 
burden of proof is on the claimant, and that the finding that the bur-
den had not been sustained was not improper. A decision on this 
basis would have been of a routine nature.4 
FREDERICK A. McDERMOTT is Dean and Professor of Law at Suffolk University 
Law School and a member of the Massachusetts and Federal Bars. He is a 
member of the Boston Bar Association Committee on Civil Procedure. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Richard J. Cain and 
Thomas F. Conneally. Jr.. members of the Board of Student Editors. in the prepara-
tion of this chapter. 
§33.1. 1 As amended by Acts of 1943. c. 529. §9. For further comment on these 
cases see §30.2 supra. 
2335 Mass. 137. 138 N.E.2d 756 (1956). 
31957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 623. 142 N.E.2d 356. 
4 The decision accords with the general rule that a violation of law. even of a 
" 
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However, the foregoing remarks of the Court purport to constitute 
dicta only for the decision was placed upon another ground which 
has disturbing implications. The opinion states that the single mem-
ber and the reviewing board took judicial notice of the regulations 
and appended a citation indicating its approval of this action.5 As 
has already been noted, violation of the applicable regulations was 
found as a fact by the Board. The opinion also recites that the claim-
ant's brief laid stress upon the regulations. The Court then states: 
but a close examination of the record fails to disclose that these 
regulations were introduced in evidence at the hearing before the 
single member. It is true that mention was occasionally made of 
such regulations but at no time were they formally placed before 
the single member "by some one of the recognized methods by 
which facts may be agreed upon or evidence introduced." We 
cannot take judicial notice of such regulations. . .. In the absence 
of these regulations there was no evidence before us that the 
death of the employee was caused "by reason of the serious and 
wilful misconduct of ... [the] employer." 6 
Finlay v. Eastern Racing Assn., Inc.,7 cited by the Court as authority 
for the decision, bears a surface similarity to the principal case, inas-
much as in the Finlay case, where rules of the State Racing Commission 
had not been placed in evidence or agreed upon before the trial court, 
the Court refused to notice them judicially on appeal. The Court in 
the Diaduk case has attempted to assimilate the cases further by using 
langauge "It is true that mention was occasionally made of such regu-
lations," 8 which would have been apropos in the Finlay case, in which 
the opinion stated "Whether or not the judge saw the 'rule book' does 
not appear," II but which hardly seems adequate in reference to the 
Diaduk proceeding, in which both the single member and the review-
ing board had judicially noticed and expressly found a violation of 
the applicable regulation. 
However, the cases are clearly distinguishable. The Court has never 
held nor even intimated that a trial court should or could judicially 
notice such regulations. The Finlay case is the leading case on 
the point and holds that domestic law in the form of state administra-
tive regulations is treated in the courts, both trial and appellate, as a 
pure question of fact. But to hold that the Finlay decision either re-
criminal statute, is merely evidence of negligence as to the consequences thereby 
intended to be prevented. See Milbury v. Turner Center System, 274 Mass. 358, 
174 N.E. 471 (1931). 
51957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 623, 624, 142 N.E.2d 356, 357. The Court cited Sciola's Case, 
236 Mass. 407, 414, 128 N.E. 666, 672 (1920). On the cited page appears the state-
ment "The Industrial Accident Board could take judicial notice of these rules," 
referring to regulations of the State Board of Labor and Industries. 
61957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 623, 624, 142 N.E.2d 356, 357. 
7308 Mass. 20, 30 N.E.2d 859 (1941). 
81957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 623, 624, 142 N.E.2d 356, 357. 
9308 Mass. 20, 27, 30 N.E.2d 859, 863 (1941). 
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quires or justifies a refusal by the Supreme Judicial Court to notice 
such regulations judicially on the review of a hearing before an ad-
ministrative tribunal where such judicial notice is proper, is to create a 
hybrid procedural variant in administrative proceedings whereby these 
domestic laws are treated as law at the trial and as fact on review. 
Such an appellate procedure might well result in reversal of a decision 
perfectly proper to the tribunal below.10 To avoid such a result 
counsel, despite the power of the administrative agency to notice such 
regulations judicially, should at the trial either obtain a stipulation 
of the text of the relevant regulations and see that the fact and content 
of the stipulation is inserted in the record, or, failing such stipulation, 
introduce the regulations in evidence and formally request an express 
finding of fact thereon. 
Domestic law in the form of municipal ordinances 11 and town by-
laws,12 as well as state administrative agency regulations, is in Massa-
chusetts courts treated as a question of fact to be proved by evidence 
and, when necessary, pleaded. The writer has earlier suggested 18 that it 
is anomalous for our courts to treat as pure fact these areas of domestic 
law when foreign law and federal administrative agency regulations 
must be judicially noticed upon being called to the attention of the 
trial court with adequate particularity,14 and in any event may be the 
subject of discretionary judicial notice on appeal to the Supreme Judi-
cial Court.lII 
10 Such a possibility. in the converse situation. has been recognized and pre-
vented by the United States Supreme Court. It generally judicially notices the law 
of the several states but, in reviewing a decision of a state court on a question 
arising under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. it limits the 
scope of its own judicial notice of the law of another state to that proper to the 
tribunal from which the appeal is taken. Hanley v. Donoghue. 116 U.S. 1. 6 Sup. 
Ct. 242. 29 L. Ed. 535 (1885). Cf. Bay State Wholesale Drug Co. v. Whitman. 280 
Mass. 188. 182 N.E. 361 (1932). 
11 Fournier v. Central Taxicab Co .• 331 Mass. 248. 118 N.E.2d 767 (1954). 
12See Mahar v. Steuer. 170 Mass. 454. 456. 49 N.E. 741. 742 (1898). To these 
might be added "private" acts of the legislature. but these are of little practical 
importance in the trial of cases generally. See Burnham v. Webster. 5 Mass. 265. 
268 (1809). 
131954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §26.3. 
14 Foreign law: Acts of 1926. c. 168. §1. now G.L .• c. 233. §70; Richards v. Richards. 
270 Mass. 113. 169 N.E. 891 (1930). Regulations of federal administrative agencies: 
Acts of 1935. c. 417. §7; 44 U.s.C. §307 (1952); Mastrullo v. Ryan. 328 Mass. 621. 
105 N.E.2d 469 (1952). 
15 Bradbury v. Central Vermont Ry .• 299 Mass. 230. 12 N.E.2d 732 (1938); Walker 
v. Lloyd. 295 Mass. 507. 4 N.E.2d 306 (1936). See Ralston v. Commissioner of 
Agriculture. 334 Mass. 51. 133 N.E.2d 589 (1956). 
Whether the trial court also may in its discretion judicially notice foreign law 
and federal administrative regulations in the absence of their being called to its 
attention with adequate particularity has not yet been definitively stated. See. as 
to the former. Medeiros v. Perry. 332 Mass. 158. 124 N.E.2d 240 (1955); Seeman v. 
Eneix. 272 Mass. 189. 172 N.E. 243 (1930); Richards v. Richards. 270 Mass. 113. 169 
N.E.2d 891 (1930); and. as to the latter. Mastrullo v. Ryan. 328 Mass. 621. 
105 N.E.2d 469 (1952). Cf. Ralston v. Commissioner of Agriculture. 334 Mass. 51. 
135 N.E.2d 589 (1956). and cases cited. 
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While it is true that the treatment accorded foreign law and federal 
regulations is the result of statutes, it is not beyond the power of the 
Court to hold that domestic law should be treated similarly, and that 
requirements that there be an adequate citation by one intending to 
rely thereon and a spelling out in the record of the tenor of the law 
judicially noticed would remove the commonly stated objections of 
complexity and ordinary unaccessibility of the text of such forms of 
law. Failing decisions by the Court to that effect, the General Court 
might well favor these areas of domestic law with statutory attention 
similar to that which it has given to foreign law. 
§33.2. Judicial notice: Validity of blood-grouping tests. In Com-
monwealth v. Stappen 1 the Court judicially noticed that, because of 
their scientific accuracy, expert testimony of blood-grouping tests was 
admissible in suits involving paternity of children, but held that an 
order to submit to blood-grouping tests could not be made under the 
authority of G.L., c. 273, §12A.2 The case is discussed elsewhere in 
the 1957 SURVEy.3 
§33.3. Inference, presumption and prima facie evidence. Certain 
sets of basic facts may be expected to recur fairly frequently in litiga· 
tion on particular issues of general importance. Whether such facts 
are legally relevant and admissible so as to furnish a basis on which 
the facts in issue may be established, and if they are, whether such 
relevance operates as a matter of law by way of inference (either logi-
calor merely legally permissive), presumption or prima facie evidence 
are often questions of some complexity. Some noteworthy illustrations 
are found in cases decided during the current SURVEY year. 
Cause of death: Accident or suicide. In Krantz v. John Hancock 
Mutual Life Insurance CO.l the beneficiary of a life insurance policy 
sought to recover under double indemnity provisions for the accidental 
drowning of the insured. The defendant insurer filed a motion for 
summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to fur-
nish "due proof" of the death of the insured caused solely by acci-
dent and not by suicide, as required by the policy. The trial judge 
ruled that the proof was insufficient as a matter of law and ordered 
judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted. 
The proof submitted to the insurer included affidavits tending to 
prove the following facts. The insured had a happy home life, was 
in good health and spirits and free from financial or other worries 
prior to an automobile accident in which he lost consciousness and was 
taken to a hospital. He said the accident resulted from his vision 
§33.2. 11957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 815, 143 N.E.2d 221. The case was an indictment 
for non-support. 
2 This section. added by Acts of 1954. c. 232. was commented on in 1954 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §26.2. By its terms the act is limited in application to proceedings 
to determine paternity. 
3 See §23.5 supra. 
§33.3. 11957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 557. 141 N.E.2d 719. For further comment on this 
case see §28.1 supra. 
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becoming blurred while driving and complained of injury to his head. 
After treatment he left the hospital and went to the police station 
and to the garage to which his car had been towed. Late that same 
afternoon his jacket, with his automobile keys and wallet~ was found 
on the bank of the Charles River near the place where he was ac-
customed to go to lie in the sun for relaxation after work. The 
weather that day was good, the sun shone, and the temperature in 
the afternoon reached 67°. The bank of the river at that place sloped 
in such a manner that one who lost his balance on the bank might ac-
cidentally fall into the river. The next day the drowned body of the 
insured was found in the river nearby. 
The Court pointed out that "proof" means evidence in some form 
calculated to convince or persuade the mind, though not necessarily 
in form admissible in a court of law, and that "due proof" is evidence 
proper and sufficient in the opinion of the court, not that of the insurer. 
The facts stated in the affidavits would, of course, give rise to a 
presumption that the death of the insured was non-suicidal. In evalu-
ating this evidence, however, the Court held that it would not only 
raise the "legal presumption" against suicide but would also warrant 
a finding of accident both on the basis of "the inference which may 
be drawn from the usual conduct of mankind in the face of the normal 
strong urge to life and the compulsions of law and religion against 
self-destruction," 2 and on the basis of the particular facts, operating 
as "circumstantial evidence supporting the inference of accident." S 
The necessity for and importance of this ruling arises from the 
presence in the case of evidence of suicide. The plaintiff's proof sub-
mitted to the insurer included a certified copy of the record of death 
and a photostatic copy of an autopsy report by the medical examiner. 
Both of these documents originally contained statements which the 
plaintiff admittedly had deleted by obliteration from the copies be-
fore submitting them to the insurer. The defendant's affidavit sup-
porting its motion for judgment showed that the statement so 
deleted from the death certificate was "Suicide during temporary state 
of insanity." The plaintiff had also crossed out printed matter on the 
"Proof of Death" form supplied by the insurance company that would 
bind her to all declarations in the documents. 
The Court held that it would not construe the insurance contract 
as requiring in effect that the plaintiff accept the opinion of the 
medical examiner as conclusive of her rights. It also held that although 
the same result could have been obtained by filing the documents 
without deletion, accompanied by an unequivocal disclaimer of the 
statements as to suicide, the course followed by the plaintiff showed 
emphatically an intent to disclaim and disavow that evidence and 
that she was therefore not bound thereby. The Court said that no 
intent to deceive or take unfair advantage was present and no 
21957 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 564. 141 N.E.2d at 725. 
I Ibid. 
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prejudice to the insurer resulted, as the information furnished would 
direct it to the public records for the further facts. 
In a letter accompanying the proof, the plaintiff stated in connec-
tion with the deletions that she had been informed by counsel that 
the opinions as to cause of death appearing on the record of death 
and on the autopsy report were not admissible in evidence in the 
event of litigation. The Court pointed out that while it was true 
that the autopsy report would be inadmissible (as hearsay opinion), 
G.L., c. 46, §19 provides that "The record of the town clerk relative 
to a ... death shall be prima facie evidence of the facts recorded," and 
G.L., c. 38, §7 and c. 46, §l require in effect that the medical examiner 
give an opinion as to accident or suicide and that the clerk record it 
in the record of facts as part of the cause and manner of death. 
In a case in which the medical examiner's opinion is based upon his 
superior knowledge applied to physical findings indicative to the 
medical expert of a particular disease or injury, it is admissable as 
expert opinion since it can be of real assistance to the jury, who do 
not have such learning. In the Krantz case, however, the facts are such 
that any inference as to suicide or accident is not a proper subject of 
expert opinion since the medical examiner is no better qualified to 
draw the inference than is the jury. Nevertheless, the opinion of the 
medical examiner contained in the record of death is admissible in 
evidence, not because of any probative force inherent in it but solely 
by virtue of the statute, which not only makes it admissible but 
ascribes to it the effect of prima facie evidence. 
In the principal case, this prima facie evidence of suicide dissolves 
the presumption of accident raised by the facts stated in the affidavits 
submitted as proof. Under well-settled Massachusetts rules of evi-
dence, there is then presented a case for the fact-finder to be decided 
on the basis of the opposing inferences remaining in the evidence, 
with the burden of proof upon the plaintiff. The Court so held, sus-
taining the plaintiff's exceptions to the ruling of the lower court that 
the plaintiff's case was insufficient as a matter of law. 
The crucial point in the opinion is the holding that the plaintiff's 
proof created an inference as well as a presumption of accidental death. 
Had the Court held that the proof had given rise only to the pre-
sumption, the presence of the prima facie evidence of suicide would 
have dissolved the presumption, leaving the plaintiff with nothing 
by the way of evidence.4 The holding that the proof had raised an 
inference as well left her with a case for the jury despite the dissolu-
tion of the presumption. 
The decision is sound. Although the Court did not say so, however, 
when it held that there was an inference against suicide arising from 
the usual conduct of mankind (as distinguished from the circumstan-
tial evidence created by the particular facts of this case), in effect it 
4Epstein v. Boston Housing Authority. 317 Mass. 297. 302. 58 N.E.2d 135. 139 
(1944). and cases cited. 
.. ,. 
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was holding that what it called the "legal presumption" against suicide 
is in reality prima facie evidence of non-suicidal death. Prima facie 
evidence, in the technical sense in which the term is used in Massa-
chusetts, means evidence which raises both an artificially compelling 
presumption and an inference.1i 
There was therefore presented prima facie evidence on both sides 
of the issue of suicide. When prima facie evidence thus meets prima 
facie evidence, as a matter of law the artificial compelling force of each 
is dissolved (as in the case of conflicting presumptions) 6 leaving the 
issue to the jury on the underlying opposing inferences.7 
The inference which underlies the presumption in prima facie evi-
dence may be either truly logical or merely permitted by law. It 
appears that the Court here ruled that the inference of accident was 
logical, on the basis of common experience and knowledge, and the 
inference of suicide created by the medical examiner's report was not 
logical but merely legally permissive. The plaintiff is of course also 
aided by the inference, also logical, which the Court held was created 
by the particular facts in the proof operating as circumstantial evidence 
of accident. 
Appeal from a zoning board of appeals: "Person aggrieved." Marotta 
v. Board of Appeals of Revere 8 is another case in the field of evidence 
which the Court carried to closely reasoned conclusions. It arose on a 
bill in equity, by way of appeal under G.L., c. 40A, §21, from a decision 
of the board of appeals granting a variance. The Superior Court ruled 
that the board did not exceed its authority in allowing the variance 
and entered a decree thereon from which the plaintiffs appealed. 
A ruling of special interest in the field of evidence came as the 
result of the defendant's contention - apparently raised for the first 
time before the Supreme Judicial Court - that the appeal must fail 
because it did not appear that the plaintiffs were "persons aggrieved" 
by the allowance of the variance, a requisite for jurisdiction in the 
Superior Court to entertain the appeal. On this point the judge 
found that the plaintiffs "are property owners determined by the 
board of appeals of Revere to be within the neighborhood affected by 
the petition" for variance. 
The statute governing notice of a hearing on a petition for a vari-
ance, G.L., c. 40A, §17, requires, inter alia, that the board of appeals 
shall send notice "to the owners of all property deemed by the board 
to be affected thereby." The Court held that "it is reasonable to hold 
that there is a presumption that property owners to whom the board 
in the performance of its statutory obligation has sent notice as per-
Ii Cook v. Farm Service Stores, Inc., !l0l Mass. 564, 17 N.E.2d 890 (19!18). 
6Turner v. Williams, 202 Mass. 500, 89 N.E. 110 (1909). 
7 Boyas v. Raymond, !l02 Mass. 519, 20 N.E.2d 411 (1939); Lexington v. R.yder. 
296 Mass. 566, 6 N.E.2d 828 (19!17). 
81957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 841, 14!1 N.E.2d 270. 
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experience with purely local factors entering into determination of 
value, in the absence of peculiar circumstances, would seem to be 
unnecessary. 
A similar position was taken by the Court in Newton Girl Scout 
Council} Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority}l involving a par-
tial taking of wooded land whose best use was a camp. The trial court 
excluded testimony of the head of the real estate department of the 
National Bureau of Private Schools, with thirty years of experience 
in surveying property suitable for camp and school purposes all over 
the country, on questions dealing with the feasibility of continued 
operation of a resident camp on the land remaining to the petitioner 
after the taking. The apparent primary ground of exclusion was that 
the witness was not engaged in buying and selling real estate in Massa-
chusetts. Holding the expert to be obviously qualified in the general 
field of use of real estate for camps and schools, and that the ques-
tions asked were pertinent to the specialized value of this property, 
the Court ruled the exclusion error. 
§33.5. Hearsay: Prior identification. Identification of an indi-
vidual in the courtroom by an eyewitness is often a dramatic pro-
cedure, particularly in the trial of a criminal case. It is clear upon 
reflection that by the time the witness makes the gesture in the court-
room, it usually comes as a foregone conclusion as a result of inter-
vening events leading up to the trial. Nevertheless, the performance 
is apt to impress a jury greatly. 
It is obviously proper to permit attack upon the weight to be given 
to a courtroom identification by a showing that on a prior occasion 
the witness identified someone else as the same person, as the Court 
held in Commonwealth v. Roselli.1 A totally different problem is pre-
sented when a party seeks to prove that a witness who has made a 
courtroom identification had on a prior occasion also identified the 
same person. Some courts have held that the prior accusation is 
offered - or will be used by the jury - as evidence that the identified 
person committed the act in question. For this purpose, the evidence 
would clearly be objectionable as irrelevant or hearsay, and on this 
reasoning these courts exclude the evidence. 
However, its admission may be justified, as an exception to the 
general rule, for the limited relevant and non-hearsay purpose of 
merely establishing the fact of the prior consistent identification of 
the same person as circumstantial evidence corroborative of the 
accuracy of the later courtrom identification. Massachusetts, the federal 
courts and a majority of the states so hold. The Massachusetts view 
was restated and affirmed in Commonwealth v. Locke.2 
§33.6. Proof of value: Damages in land taking. The unprece-
5335 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956). 
§33.5. 1335 Mass. 38, 138 N.E.2d 607 (1956). For further comment on prior 
identification see §23.4 supra. 
2335 Mass. 106, 138 N.E.2d 359 (1956). 
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dented program of land taking entailed in the extensive highway 
development programs of the Commonwealth in recent years has 
produced a spate of land damage cases at the trial level and, as would 
be expected, many questions therein raised continue to furnish grist 
to the mill of the Supreme Judicial Court. Limitations of space per-
mit notice of the evidence aspects of only a few of these cases. 
In Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Au-
thority 1 there was a partial taking of land devoted to use as a camp, 
which was also its highest and best use. The land was well developed, 
with living and service quarters suitable for a camp but not for usual 
residential purposes. There was evidence that the remaining land 
would be practically valueless for camp purposes. There was also 
evidence, as the Court judicially noticed, that there is no very active 
market in such property and that sales of comparable property are 
not common. 
In such cases, as was shown in the opinion by ample citation of 
Massachusetts precedents,2 resort must be had to valuation data other 
than that of market value. Knowledge of values of local land suitable 
for ordinary residential or commercial use is not as helpful as knowl-
edge of comparable specialized properties and their use and demand 
over a wide geographical area. Expert opinion testimony as to the 
real value of the land for the specialized use is admissible in such 
cases.s 
It was also held error to admit over objection hearsay testimony 
(even by an expert) as to the price paid on a sale of other comparable 
land. The distinction therein made is clear. If an expert is giving his 
own opinion as to value, he may utilize information derived from such 
hearsay as a basis for and state it as a ground of his opinion. But where 
the evidence of the sale price of other land is itself offered directly on 
the issue of market value, it may not be established by hearsay evidence. 
The Court held that where the sale price is offered for this purpose a 
party to the sale must be produced who can be subjected to cross-
examination. 
Rental value of the land whose value is in issue on a taking is ad-
missible as some indication of its fair market value. However, it was 
held in Wenton v. Commonwealth 4 that evidence of the rental value 
of another parcel of land is not admissible on that issue, even though 
the premises are comparable, so that a price paid on a sale of the other 
land would be admissible. The probative worth of rental value of 
other land was held to be not sufficient to justify the multiplication of 
issues and fact finding which its admission would necessarily entail. 
In Ford v. Worcester Ii cross-examination of one of the petitioners 
§33.6. 1335 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956). 
2 See Ford v. Worcester, 1957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 581, 142 N.E.2d 327, noted below 
in this section. 
S Muzi v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 101, 138 N.E.2d 578 (1956). 
4335 Mass. 78, 138 N.E.2d 609 (1956). 
61957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 581, 142 N.E.2d 327. 
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had brought out the price paid by them for the land taken. The pur-
chase price having thus been made relevant, petitioners offered testi-
mony to show that the sale to them was at a reduced price because of 
the entry of the former owners into military service. Exclusion of this 
evidence was held to be error. Such pressure on the sellers was held 
to be relevant and evidence thereof admissible, even though it did not 
amount to proof of compulsion. 
Evidence of compulsion would dissolve the presumption that a sale 
price otherwise relevant to the issue of value was fixed freely and not 
under compulsion, and in the absence of evidence of non-compulsion, 
would render the other sale price inadmissible on the issue of value.6 
While the offered evidence would not rebut the presumption, it would 
reduce the weight to be given to the sale price as evidence, and for 
this purpose it was admissible. 
In Onorato Brothers, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority," 
petitioner offered evidence as to the amount remaining due upon a 
mortgage on the land taken on the issue of its market value. The 
Court held that the trial judge rightly excluded this evidence because 
there was no proof that the mortgage balance in this instance had any 
relation to the value of the property taken. Since the Court was ap-
parently of the opinion that in a proper case relevance of mortgage 
value to at least the minimum market value of land might be shown, 
it avoided laying down a general rule to the effect that evidence of 
mortgage value is always to be excluded in eminent domain matters. 
The only Massachusetts case cited on the matter,S while its implications 
would favor a general rule of exclusion, is not squarely in point. The 
opinion in the principal case therefore indicates that evidence of mort-
gage value, which might well have been thought to be always inad-
missible as remote, may on a proper showing be held to be relevant 
and admissible. 
6 See Epstein v. Boston Housing Authority. 517 Mass. 297. 58 N.E.2d 155 (1944). 
'11957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 675. 142 N.E.2d 589. 
8 Peirson v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co .• 191 Mass. 225. 251·254. 77 N.E. 769. 772-
774 (1906) 
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